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POTENTIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN A
FUTURE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY
AND THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976
Jon L. Jacobson* and Douglas G. Cameron**
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM SUMMARIZED
On March 1, 1977, the United States "200-mile-limit" law-the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 19761--became effec-
tive. By this congressional enactment, which was signed into law on
April 13, 1976,2 the United States unilaterally claims "exclusive man-
agement authority" over all fish except highly migratory species 3
within a "fishery conservation zone' 4 having an outer boundary 200
* Professor of Law and Director, Ocean Resources Law Program, University of
Oregon.
** Third-year law student and Research Associate, Ocean Resources Law Pro-
gram, University of Oregon.
The authors would like to thank the Sea Grant Program in Oregon, a part of the
National Sea Grant Program, Department of Commerce, for partial funding in support
of this study. The views expressed here are, however, solely those of the authors.
The article can be viewed as a preliminary assessment of some of the problems
associated with potential conflicts between United States fisheries laws and a future
Law of the Sea treaty. The article is a project of the Ocean Resources Law Program
currently proposed for funding by the Sea Grant Program.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882
(West Supp. 1977)) [hereinafter cited as FCMA or the Act].
2. See 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 644 (Apr. 13, 1976); OCEAN Sci. NEWS,
April 16, 1976, at 2.
3. FCMA § 3(14), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(14) (West Supp. 1977). Section 3(14)
defines "highly migratory species" as "species of tuna which, in the course of their life
cycle, spawn and migrate over great distances in waters of the ocean." (emphasis
added). In addition, the definition of "fish" specifically excludes "highly migratory
species." Id. § 3(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(6). Thus, the United States has specifically
declined to assert any authority over tuna even while within the 200-mile zone. This
exclusion is further reiterated by id. § 103, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1813: "The exclusive fishery
management authority of the United States shall not include, nor shall it be construed
to extend to, highly migratory species of fish."
4. Id.§ 101, 16U.S.C.A. § 1811, provides that:
There is established a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States
to be known as the fishery conservation zone. The inner boundary of the fishery
conservation zone is a line coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of
the coastal States, and the outer boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such a
manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which
the territorial sea is measured.
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nautical miles from shore.5 In addition, the Act asserts the claim to
exclusive fishery management authority over all United States-source
anadromous species( (essentially salmon) "throughout the migratory
range of each such species beyond the fishery conservation zone,"
except when found in foreign waters, 7 and claims exclusive authority
over all "Continental Shelf fishery resources" beyond 200 miles. 8 Ves-
sels of a foreign nation may be allowed to fish in the conservation
zone for that part of a fishery's optimum yield :  not harvested by
United States vessels, but usually only if the foreign nation has entered
into a "Governing International Fishery Agreement."1 The Act also
5. Id. Pending agreement on and ratification of a new Law of the Sea (LOS)
treaty, the territorial sea baseline remains as defined by the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Continguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, art. 3, [1964] 15 U.S.T.
1606, 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 208 (entered in force Sep. 10, 1964).
6. "Anadromous species" are defined as "species of fish which spawn in fresh or
estuarine waters of the United States and which migrate to ocean waters." FCMA §
3(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(1) (West Supp. 1977).
7. Id. § 102, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812, provides, with respect to anadromous species:
The United States shall exercise exclusive fishery management authority, in the
manner provided for in this Act, over the following:
(2) All anadromous species throughout the migratory range of each such species
beyond the fishery conservation zone; except that such management authority shall
not extend to such species during the time they are found within any foreign na-
tion's territorial sea or fishery conservation zone (or the equivalent), to the extent
that such sea or zone is recognized by the United States.
8. The term "Continental Shelf fishery resources" is defined by listing known species
of colenterata, crustacea, mollusks, and sponges, and providing criteria for future addi-
tions to this otherwise exclusive list. Id. § 3(4). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(4). A limit to
the geographical extent of "Continental Shelf fishery resources" is provided by defining
"Continental Shelf" as follows:
The term "Continental Shelf" means the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, of the
United States, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth
of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
such areas.
Id. § 3(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(3). This definition follows closely the language of
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, art. 1, [1964]
15 U.S.T. 471, 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312 (entered in force
June 10, 1964). For the definition of Continental Shelf in the Revised Single Nego-
tiating Text of the current United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, see note 24
infra.
9. The optimum yield of a fishery is defined in FCMA § 3(18), 16 U.S.C.A. §
1802(18) (West Supp. 1977).
10. Foreign fishing is prohibited within the fishery conservation zone and for
anadromous species and Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond the fishery con-
servation zone, in the absence of an existing agreement or a "Governing International
Fishery Agreement" (GIFA), entered into between that foreign nation and the gov-
ernment of the United States. FCMA § 201, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (West Supp. 1977).
This section further provides mandatory terms and conditions to be included in each
GIFA, limits the total allowable level of foreign fishing to that portion of the optimum
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contains a complex domestic scheme for the management of the fish-
eries within the claimed jurisdiction.11
Congress has thus apparently resolved a longstanding domestic
debate over United States participation in the worldwide trend toward
establishment of 200-mile offshore zones for coastal nations. 12 Until
recently, the executive branch has resisted a unilateral claim by the
United States on the principal ground that high seas fisheries manage-
ment is an international problem to be resolved by international
agreement resulting from negotiations in the Third United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference (LOS III). 13 Congressional impatience
with the lack of progress in the LOS III negotiations finally led the
executive branch to end its resistance. 14 LOS III has been in session
since December 1973, having met five times thus far without reaching
agreement on any of the many ocean law items on the agenda.' 5 Al-
though some progress has been made in the negotiations concerning
fisheries management, other issues-principally regulation of deep-
seabed mining-have created serious obstacles to the conclusion of a
widely acceptable comprehensive treaty.' 6 A "package deal" approach
yield of a fishery which will not be harvested by vessels of the United States, and pro-
vides criteria for the allocation of allowable foreign fishing among the foreign nations
concerned.
11. Id.§§ 301-311, 16U.S.C.A. §§ 1851-1861.
12. Unilateral fisheries-protection action was first taken by the United States with
passage of the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act, Act of Oct. 14, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
658, 80 Stat. 908, which extended United States exclusive fisheries authority to 12
miles. Since then, proposals have been continually made in the United States Congress
for extension of the United States exclusive fishing zone. Some of the early attempts
following passage of the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act included H.R. 627, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), which was introduced to extend United States fishing jurisdiction to
at least 50 miles, and H.R. 628 and H.R. 1675, both also in the 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
which were introduced to extend the fishing zone to 200 miles offshore.
13. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 197 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Ma-
rine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-50 (1975) (letter of John Norton Moore,
Chairman, National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea,
and Deputy Special Representative of the President, for the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence).
14. 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 644 (Apr. 13, 1976).
15. The previous five sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference have been held as
follows: 1) December 3 to December 21, 1973, in New York City; 2) June 28 to
August 29, 1974, in Caracas; 3) March 17 to May 3, 1975, in Geneva; 4) March 15
to May 7, 1976, in New York City; 5) August 2 to September 17, 1976, in New York
City. The summary records and documents through the fourth session are collected
in Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (5 vol., 1975-76) [here-
inafter cited as Third U.N. Conf.].
16. Miles, An Interpretation of the Caracas Proceedings, in LAw OF THE SEA:
CARACAS AND BEYOND 39, 56-73 (F. Christy, T. Clingan, J. Gamble, H. Knight,
E. Miles eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CARACAS AND BEYOND].
453
Washington Law Review
has so far precluded agreement on any particular items without agree-
ment on all. 17
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a treaty containing widely ac-
ceptable provisions on fisheries management jurisdiction could, in the
near future, emerge from the current LOS Conference. Agreement
could be reached in either of essentially two ways: (1) the deep-seabed
deadlock could be broken, and comprehensive agreement would
follow; or, more likely, (2) the "package deal" approach could be
abandoned and certain nearly settled issues, including fisheries man-
agement, would be agreed upon in the form of a less than comprehen-
sive treaty or set of treaties.
If proposed international rules on fisheries jurisdiction do indeed
emerge from the LOS III negotiations in the near future, it is pres-
ently possible to predict accurately what those rules will be. It has, for
example, been quite obvious for at least two years that the concept of
"exclusive economic zones," granting coastal states exclusive or nearly
exclusive jurisdiction over living resources out to 200 miles from
shore, will substantially replace the traditional "freedom to fish" rule. 18
This much is clear from the record of LOS III negotiations 19 and is
reinforced by the series of national claims to such jurisdiction. 20
In addition, the LOS III process has produced what are reputed to
be highly negotiated and generally acceptable draft provisions on fish-
eries management jurisdiction. These are currently contained in the
Revised Single Negotiating Text (Revised Text),21 which is the prin-
17. See Johnston, The Options for LOS III: Appraisal and Proposal, in CARACAS
AND BEYOND, supra note 17, at 357. In this paper Professor Douglas M. Johnston has
proposed a series of more limited treaty objectives-alternatives to the "package deal"
concept of a single all-encompassing convention supported by universal (or near-
universal) consent-and has evaluated their potential for leading to successful nego-
tiation of a Law of the Sea Treaty. See also P. RAO, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEAN
RESOURCES 203 (1975).
18. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 42 (H. Knight ed.
1975). See also P. RAO, supra note 17, at 201.
19. See Miles, supra note 16, at 77-81.
20. As of December 1975, 14 nations claimed authority over fishing matters out
to 200 miles. See BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LIMITS
IN THE SEAS No. 36, NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION (3rd rev. ed. 1975).
Since that time the very significant 200-mile assertions by the United States, Mexico,
Canada, the Soviet Union, and the European Economic Community have been made.
21. 5 Third U.N. Conf. 125-201, U.N. Docs. A/CONF.621WP.8/Rev.l &
A/CONF.621WP.9/Rev.1 (1976). Part II of the Revised Text contains its major pro-
visions concerning fisheries management jurisdiction and subsequent citations are to
specific articles of Part II unless otherwise indicated. The LOS III negotiating docu-
ment preceding the Revised Text was the Informal Single Negotiating Text (Informal
Text), 4 Third U.N. Conf. 137-8 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62WP.8 (1975).
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cipal document around which LOS III negotiations are now pro-
ceeding. Part Il of the Text not only sets out the basic grant of 200-
mile fisheries jurisdiction to coastal states22 but also contains several
articles on the content of that jurisdiction.23 Coastal state rights in
living resources of the Continental Shelf are also described.
24
It is probably unnecessary to point out that these anticipated fish-
eries provisions of a potential international treaty are not completely
consistent with the provisions of the Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act (FCMA), even though both adopt the 200-mile zone
concept. For example, the Act's anadromous-species claim would not
be authorized by the treaty. 25 On the other hand, some control over
highly migratory species, excluded from the Act, is allowed under the
Revised Text.26
The problem that forms the crux of this article is thus presented: If
the United States should ratify27 a Law of the Sea treaty containing
22. Article 44(1) describes the rights of each state in an "exclusive economic
zone" adjacent to its coastlines as follows:
1. In an area beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, described as the exclu-
sive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the bed and
subsoil of the superijacent waters;
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use
of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(c) Exclusive jurisdiction with regard to:
(i) Other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; and
(ii) Scientific research;
(d) Jurisdiction with regard to the preservation of the marine environment,
including pollution control and abatement;
(e) Other rights and duties provided for in the present Convention.
The breadth of the exclusive economic zone "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
Article 46.
23. Id. Articles 44-63.
24. Article 64 defines the Continental Shelf, and coastal state rights over the nat-
ural resources of the continental shelf are described in Article 65.
25. See notes 42-51 and accompanying text infra.
26. Under the Revised Text, highly migratory species would be among the nat-
ural resources in the superjacent waters of the exclusive economic zone over which
the coastal state is granted sovereignty. Article 44(l)(a). In addition, however, the
coastal state and other states that fish highly migratory species in the region are ad-
monished to cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations to
ensure conservation and optimum utilization both within and beyond the exclusive
economic zone. Article 53(1).
27. Any treaty resulting from the Third Law of the Sea Conference will undoubt-
edly be deemed a "treaty" within the meaning of article II of the United States Con-
stitution. See U.S. CONST. art. II., § 2, cl. 2. Under that constitutional provision,
treaties are required to be ratified by the President upon the advice and consent of the
Senate. See notes 208-10 and accompanying text infra.
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the fisheries management rules now found in the Revised Text, what
would be the effect of ratification on conflicting provisions of the
FCMA?
In section 401 the Act itself purports to anticipate the possibility of
a subsequent United States ratification of an LOS treaty:
If the United States ratifies a comprehensive treaty, which includes
provisions with respect to fishery conservation and management juris-
diction, resulting from any United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, the Secretary [of Commerce], after consultation with the Sec-
retary of State, may promulgate any amendment to the regulations
promulgated under this Act if such amendment is necessary and ap-
propriate to conform such regulations to the provisions of such treaty,
in anticipation of the date when such treaty shall come into force and
effect for, or otherwise be applicable to, the United States.2
The emphases added to this quotation illustrate two significant aspects
of the anticipatory provision. First, by reference to a "comprehensive"
LOS treaty the provision arguably does not anticipate the higher like-
lihood that fisheries provisions will be contained in a less than com-
prehensive LOS treaty.2 9 Second, it does not expressly contemplate
that the Act itself will be amended to conform to a treaty, only that
the "regulations" under the Act may be amended.
The most significant aspect of this provision, however, is that it
does not call for the automatic termination of the Act upon the effec-
tive date of a subsequent treaty. Early versions of the bill which later
became the extended jurisdiction law did include an automatic-termi-
nation clause,30 under which the United States would have entered
into its LOS treaty obligations with a blank legislative slate. Congress
28. FCMA § 401, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1881 (West Supp. 1977).
29. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
30. S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), introduced on March 5 by Senator
Warren Magnuson from the State of Washington, contained the following language
in § 1 (b):
TERMINATION DATE. The provisions of this Act shall expire and cease to be
of any legal force and effect on such date as the Law of the Sea Treaty, or other
comprehensive treaty with respect to fishery jurisdiction, which the United States
has signed or is party to, shall come into force or is provisionally applied.
S. 1988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973), which was introduced by Senator Magnuson on
June 13, 1973, had contained an identical provision in its § 1 l(b). Other bills intro-
duced into the House simultaneously with H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
which became the final Act, contained language substantially equivalent to the "cease
to be of any legal force and effect" provision of S. 961. See, e.g., H.R. 3412, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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could then have enacted a management law consistent with the treaty,
and the necessity for the present discussion might have been obviated.
The automatic termination provision was apparently replaced by the
present section 401 at approximately the same time it was decided
that the bill should include comprehensive provisions detailing the
establishment of a complex domestic system for management of the
new fisheries jurisdiction.31 The Act now provides for eight Regional
Fishery Management Councils, composed of federal and state repre-
sentatives, 32 whose main job will be to devise the actual rules of
fishing in the areas of extended jurisdiction. 33 The drafters of the Act
presumably-and if so, wisely to this extent-felt that the compli-
cated management system created by the Act should not be demol-
ished automatically upon United States agreement to a treaty author-
izing extended fisheries jurisdiction. As it now stands, the Act will not
terminate, by its terms,3 4 upon the effective date of the treaty for the"
United States. In fact, it can be argued that the Act's anticipatory
clause, especially in light of its legislative history, exhibits a congres-
sional intent that the Act itself, as contrasted with promulgated "regu-
lations," would remain effective and unchanged even after ratification
of an LOS treaty.
This argument, however, is not justified. First, Congress can of
course amend its own act at any time, whether that act does or does
not anticipate future changes. 35 Second, it is quite possible that parts
31. The original H.R. 200 contained no comprehensive conservation and manage-
ment provisions when it was first submitted to committee for hearings along with
companion bills on the same subject. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 197 et al. Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975). At that
time H.R. 200 did include an automatic termination provision. Id. at 9. H.R. 3412,
one of the companion bills submitted along with H.R. 200, contained both compre-
hensive domestic fishery conservation and management provisions and a termination
clause very similar to the present FCMA § 401, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1881 (West Supp.
1977). Id. at 30.
32. The Act establishes eight Regional Fishery Management Councils and desig-
nates the state composition and management jurisdiction of each Council. FCMA §
302, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852 (Wet Supp. 1977).
33. The Act directs each Council to prepare fishery management plans and enum-
erates both required and discretionary provisions of the plans. Id. §§ 302(h), 303,
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1852(h), 1853. For an analysis of the implications of the Regional
Councils' membership and structure, see Pontecorvo, Fishery Management and the
General Welfare: Implications of the New Structure, 52 WASH. L. REV. 641 (1977).
34. Ratification of the Law of the Sea treaty by the United States may itself auto-
matically terminate at least part of the Act upon the treaty's effective date. See text
accompanying notes 128-205, infra.




of the LOS treaty will, upon its effective date following ratification,
automatically supersede parts of the Act under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution36 without any action by Congress as a whole and,
again, despite any previously expressed wishes of the legislative body.
Therefore, any provision in the Act prohibiting or setting guidelines
for the Act's own amendment would be a fruitless exercise. On the
other hand, it was entirely proper for the drafters of the Act to antici-
pate and to authorize in advance any new regulations that the treaty
might require. Congress, however, can be faulted for failing to foresee
a non-"comprehensive" LOS treaty containing fishery rules. Neverthe-
less, in the context, the word "comprehensive" can and should be in-
terpreted to include not only an LOS treaty covering the whole gamut
of items on the LOS III agenda 37 but any multilateral treaty "resulting
from"3 8 LOS III which contains a broad scheme of rules on fisheries
management jurisdiction. Thus, a proper interpretation of the Act's
anticipatory provision would allow amendment of regulations promul-
gated under the Act, should the Act or appropriate parts of it remain
in effect, to conform to a subsequent "comprehensive" LOS treaty,
whether that treaty deals only with fisheries or with the complete
range of ocean law topics.
As the ensuing discussion will show, however, the Act and the pre-
dictable treaty cannot be made entirely consistent with one another by
the mere amendment of regulations. Changes in the Act itself will be
required if the United States is to fulfill its treaty obligations. This ar-
ticle identifies some of the areas of conflict between the Act and the
probable LOS treaty in the area of fisheries jurisdiction and manage-
ment. In addition, the article examines methods by which the United
States, if it chooses to become a treaty party, might resolve the con-
flicts consistent with its obligations under international law.
36. See notes 128-205 and accompanying text infra.
37. The Revised Text covers in detail a wide range of marine issues of inter-
national concern of which sovereignty over natural resources in the exclusive economic
zones of coastal states is only a part. Other issues currently being negotiated include
marine scientific research, preservation of the marine environment and protection
from pollution, an international regime concerning the deep seabed and ocean floor,
the rights of landlocked states, rights of passage through straits used for international
navigation and provisions for the settlement of disputes. Altogether there are 25 major
agenda items, including over 80 specific subitems. See 2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW
OF THE SEA 745-49 (S. Lay, R. Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. (1973). For a discus-
sion of the issue of submerged transit through straits, see Burke, Submerged Passage
Through Straits: Interpretations of the Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty Text, 52
WASH. L. REV. 193 (1977).
38. FCMA § 401, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1881 (West Supp. 1977).
458
Vol. 52: 451, 1977
Potential Conflicts with LOS Treaty
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ACT AND THE
PROBABLE LOS TREATY
A. The United States Obligation Under International Law
If ratification of the predicted treaty by the United States is as-
sumed, the United States obligation under international law is simply
stated: pacta sunt servanda.39 That is, the "contract" represented by
the treaty must be carried out according to its terms. Although incon-
sistent provisions of the FCMA may or may not remain in effect as
domestic law upon the effective date of the treaty following ratifica-
tion,40 the Act could not be legally enforced against nationals of
other treaty parties if such enforcement were contrary to the treaty's
provisions. Thus, the treaty will establish jurisdictional boundaries,
both as to geography and content, within which the United States as a
coastal state may operate but beyond which it may not trespass with
respect to other treaty parties.41
B. Conflicts Between Treaty and Act
If the FCMA and a treaty containing the fisheries management
parts of the Revised Text.were simultaneously in effect for the United
States-the treaty defining the extent of the United States interna-
tional legal rights to fisheries jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea,
and the Act asserting exclusive national claims to the same subject
matter-the overlapping of the jurisdictional rights granted under the
treaty and the claims asserted under the Act would reveal several vari-
39. Pacta sunt servanda, the foundation upon which the treaty structure is based,
is the principle that states must carry out their treaty obligations. A. McNAIR, THE
LAW OF TREATIES 493 (1961). See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
done May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 63 AJ.I.L. 875,
884 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 138 (1965).
40. This depends on the self-executing nature of the treaty's provisions. See notes
128-205 and accompanying text infra.
41. If the LOS Treaty is widely ratified, it will arguably also reflect customary
international law and thus be an expression of international law binding on nonparties
as well. I.CJ. Stat., art. 381)(b). See also 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW § 3 (Dep't of State Pub. No. 1506, 1940). The present rash of unilateral
claims to 200-mile fishery zones and the responses to these claims will provide strong
support for this argument. See note 23 supra. See also H. Knight, The Law of the
Sea: Cases, Documents and Readings 459-62 (1975) (discussion of customary inter-
national law and its relation to certain law of the sea issues).
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ances of substance. Many represent conflicts that could not be re-
solved without changes in the Act.
1. A nadronous species jurisdiction
The most serious conflict between the potential treaty and the Act
concerns jurisdiction over anadromous species or stocks. The Act
defines "anadromous species" as "species of fish which spawn in fresh
or estuarine waters of the United States and which migrate to ocean
waters." 42 The various species of salmon comprise the principal anad-
romous species.43 As noted above, the FCMA asserts a claim to exclu-
sive management authority over anadromous species throughout their
migratory ranges, even beyond the 200-mile zone (except when the
fish are in areas of recognized foreign waters). 44 Geographically, this
is a massive claim: Pacific salmon which spawn in United States wa-
ters often migrate as far as 1,000 nautical miles from the United States
shores, their migratory patterns including huge areas of ocean. 45 The
extra-200-mile anadromous species claim is made in the interest of
preventing foreign fishermen-especially Japanese-from engaging in
unregulated fishing for American-source salmon on the high seas be-
yond 200 miles and thereby thwarting the United States management
scheme.46
42. FCMA § 3(I), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(1) (West Supp. 1977).
43. See generally U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, ANADRO-
MOUS FISH RESOURCES (1970).
44. FCMA § 102(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812(2) (West Supp. 1977), quoted at note 7
supra.
45. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARINE RESOURCES 588-94 (F. Firth ed. 1969). For a
map of the distribution and migratory patterns of North Pacific salmon, see J. GUL-
LAND, THE FISH RESOURCES OF THE OCEAN Fig. 2.4 (1971).
46. Japanese fishermen are presently prevented from fishing North American salmon
in the Pacific Ocean east of 175' West Longitude. International Convention for the
High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (INPFC), done May 9, 1952, Annex,
[1953] 4 U.S.T. 380, 391, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65, 98. Nevertheless, they
do catch substantial numbers of American salmon on the high seas even beyond the
175' line. See generally NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMO-
SPHERIC ADM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/
PRELIMINARY FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, HIGH SEAS SALMON FISHERIES OF JAPAN (1977).
It has been predicted that a United States 200-mile zone claim would cause Japan
to withdraw from or abrogate the INPFC, thus allowing Japanese fishing for Amer-
ican salmon over the whole Pacific beyond the 200-mile zone. See, e.g., Hear-
ings on H.R. 200 Before the Subcomn. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong..
1st Sess. 514 (1975) (Statement of Robert 0. Archer, Vice Pres., Ass'n of Pacific
Fisheries). The current United States claim to anadromous species jurisdiction through-
out the species' migratory range is the result. It nevertheless appears unlikely that the
United States will enforce the claim beyond 200 miles.
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The Revised Text, in what is purportedly a highly negotiated com-
promise between Japan and the salmon-source nations, would grant
to source nations only "primary interest in and responsibility for"
anadromous stocks originating in their rivers.47 In general, fishing for
anadromous stocks beyond coastal state economic zones would be
prohibited,48 and the "State of origin" would establish regulatory meas-
ures for its source-stocks. 49 Each state of origin, however, is admon-
ished to "co-operate in minimizing dislocation in such other States
fishing these stocks, taking into account the normal catch and the
mode of operations of such States, and all the areas in which such
fishing has occurred." 50 Further, enforcement of the state of origin's
anadromous-species regulations beyond the economic zone "shall be
by agreement between the State of origin and the other States con-
cerned." 51
Thus, while the Act asserts exclusive United States juri-diction over
American salmon throughout their high seas migrations, the predict-
able treaty will require some international cooperation in promul-
gating and enforcing salmon regulations applicable beyond the 200-
47. Article 55(l) states: "States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate
shall have the primary interest in and responsibility for such stocks."
48. Article 55(3)(a) provides: "Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be con-
ducted only in the waters landwards of the outer limits of exclusive economic zones,
except in cases where this provision would result in economic dislocation for a State
other than the State of origin."
49. Article 55(2) provides:
The State of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure their conservation by the
establishment of appropriate regulatory measures for fishing in all waters land-
wards of the outer limits of its exclusive economic zone and for fishing provided
for in [paragraph 3(b)]. The State of origin may, after consultation with other
States fishing these stocks, establish total allowable catches for stocks originating
in its rivers.
50. Article 55(3)(b). Currently, substantial numbers of American-source salmon
are being taken by Japanese gillnets on the high seas. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARINE
RESOURCES 591-92 (F. Firth ed. 1969). See also P. CHITWOOD, JAPANESE, SOVIET, AND
SOUTH KOREAN FISHERIES OFF ALASKA 12-15 (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. circular
310, 1969). See generally NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NAT'L OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADM'N, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTIPRELIMINARY FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, HIGH SEAS SALMON FISHERIES
OF JAPAN (1977).
51. Article 55(3)(d). Cooperation and agreement concerning anadromous species
is further called for among "interested states" by Articles 55(4) and 55(5). Article
55(4) provides: "In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the
waters [within] the exclusive economic zone of a State other than the State of origin,
such State shall co-operate with the State of origin with regard to the conservation
and management of such stocks." Article 55(5) admonishes the state of origin and
other states fishing those anadromous stocks to "make arrangements for the implemen-
tation of the provisions of this article, where appropriate, through regional organiza-
tions."
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mile economic zone. The Act claims more than the treaty will allow,
presenting the first conflict.
2. Foreign access
The Act and the Revised Text share the same basic approach to
foreign fishing access: Foreign access to living resources of the 200-
mile zone is authorized to the extent that the coastal nation does not
have the capacity to take the allowable harvest.5 2 There are, however.
conflicts in the respective implementations of this basic allocation
philosophy.
a. Extent of the United States obligation
The Revised Text uses language which, on its surface, appears to
mandate the allocation of catch surplus to vessels of foreign nations:
"Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the en-
tire allowable catch, it shall . . . give other States access to the sur-
plus of the allowable catch."5 3 The Act nowhere contains words
clearly requiring foreign access. On the contrary, the United States
claim is to "exclusive management authority.• 4 Moreover, the au-
thority given by Congress to the Secretaries of State and Commerce to
arrange for foreign fishing is defined in discretionary language5 5 and is
expressed in terms of an exception to the general exclusion of foreign
fishing. 56 Thus, the United States, under the Act's term, is arguably
52. See FCMA § 202(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1822(d) (West Supp. 1977).
53. Article 51(2) (emphasis added).
54. FCMA § 102, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812 (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
55. Section 201(b) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[floreign fish-
ing... may be conducted pursuant to an international fishery agreement." Id. § 20 1(b),
16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(b) (emphasis added). Similar discretionary language is again
used in describing the content of the Governing International Fishery Agreements.
Id. § 201(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 182 1(c).
56. The Act provides, with regard to foreign fishing in general, that "[a] fter Feb-
ruary 28, 1977, no foreign fishing is authorized within the fishery conservation zone,
or for anadromous species or Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond the fishery
conservation zone, unless such foreign fishing" is allowed by either an Existing Inter-
national Fishery Agreement (subsection (b)) or a Governing International Fishery
Agreement (subsection (c)), is conducted under a valid section 204 permit, and is
not prohibited by subsection (f). Id. § 201(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a) (emphasis
added). Section 201(f) further provides: "Foreign fishing shall not be authorized for
the fishing vessels of any foreign nation unless" certain conditions are met. Id. § 201(0.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(f) (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 70 infra. If
Congress had intended to require foreign access to harvest excess resources, the perti-
nent language would arguably have been that "foreign fishing is authorized . . . if"
certain conditions are met.
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not required to allow foreign access-or, to state the proposition more
accurately, the authority claimed on behalf of the United States by the
Act apparently includes the authority to exclude foreign fishing alto-
gether.
Yet neither interpretation is by any means certain. The reverse can
be argued in the case of either the Revised Text or the Act. The Re-
vised Text, while seemingly stating a duty of the coastal nation to
allow foreign access to the surplus, conditions that duty on important
determinations that lie within the complete control of the coastal na-
tion. Thus, the coastal nation will determine: The total "allowable
catch";57 its own capacity to harvest the allowable catch; 58 within
broad bounds, the "relevant" access factors;59 and, again with practi-
cally no limitation, the terms and conditions of foreign fishing.60 As a
practical matter, then, the extent of coastal nation control over for-
eign access granted in the Revised Text appears to be limitless. Little,
if anything, remains of the supposed "duty" to grant foreign fishing
access.
On the other hand, it is far from clear that the Act claims authority
to exclude foreign fishing entirely. "Exclusive" might refer to the right
to manage rather than the power to exclude foreigners. Some "shalls"
do appear in the provisions concerning foreign fishing, 6' and, most
telling, one of Congress stated purposes in enacting the law is "to
permit foreign fishing consistent with the provisions of this Act. ' 62
Furthermore, the Act has reportedly been interpreted by the executive
branch as requiring foreign access to the surplus portions of United
States fisheries. 63
Nevertheless, the Revised Text, in theory at least, would impose on
a coastal-nation party an international obligation to allow foreign
fishing in its economic zone under the conditions noted, while one in-
terpretation of the FCMA is that foreign access is not mandated.






61. See FCMA § 201(d)-(e), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1821(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1977).
62. Id. § 2(c)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(c)(4).
63. See OCEAN Sci. NEWS, Dec. 31, 1976, at 1.
64. The Act's legislative history tends to resolve this uncertainty in favor of man-




The Revised Text would grant broad discretion to the coastal na-
tion to decide which foreign nations are to be allowed entry to the
exclusive economic zone and to determine the resource allocations
among the nations granted access.6 5 The coastal nation is "required"
to take into account "all relevant factors" in making these decisions. 66
Some of the factors it must consider include, inter alia, certain rights of
adjoining landlocked nations6 ;7 and certain developing coastal nations
in the same subregion or region. 68
Although the FCMA is basically consistent with this provision of the
Revised Text, nothing in the Act specifically authorizes or directs the
Secretaries of State and Commerce to consider the above factors when
determining the allocations to foreign fishing nations. The United
States has no adjoining landlocked neighbors; yet South Korea,
Mexico and other Latin American nations, and perhaps even Taiwan,
are arguably "developing" nations of the "subregion or region" and
thus entitled to be given special consideration should the Revised Text
become part of a treaty ratified by the United States. It might be con-
tended that this potential conflict between the Revised Text and the
Act is avoided by the Act's residual direction to the Secretaries to con-
sider "such other matters as [they deem] appropriate, ' '69 but another
of the Act's provisions casts some doubt on this contention. Section
201(f) states:
Foreign fishing shall not be authorized for the fishing vessels of any
foreign nation unless such nation satisfies the Secretary [of Corn-
history contains indications of divided opinion as to whether the Act empowers the
United States to exclude foreign fishermen totally, see SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE &
NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 440-441 (Comm. Print
1976) (remarks of Senators Magnuson and Gravel), the legislative record as a whole
is more consistent with the notion that the United States has an obligation to negotiate
in good faith for foreign access to surplus fish stocks (at least for traditional foreign
fishing nations). See, e.g., id. at 679-80, 682, 899.
Senator Magnuson, one of the principal sponsors of the FCMA, has stated in this
Symposium that it was not the intent of Congress to exclude foreign fishing, but
rather to give preference to American fishermen. See Magnuson, The Fishery Conser-
vation and Management Act of 1976: First Step Toward Improved Management of
Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 435 (1977).
65. Article 51(3).
66. Id.
67. Id.; Article 58.
68. Articles 51(3), 59.
69. FCMA § 201(e)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (e)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
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merce] and the Secretary of State that such nation extends substan-
tially the same fishing privileges to fishing vessels of the United States,
if any, as the United States extends to foreign fishing vessels.70
Thus, while the Revised Text would direct discrimination in favor of
certain regional developing foreign fishing nations, section 201(f) of
the Act specifically would disallow such special treatment unless those
nations reciprocated with "substantially the same fishing privileges" in
favor of fishermen from the United States, a developed nation.7l The
Act, therefore, could prohibit what the treaty will require, thus cre-
ating another potential conflict.
3. Enforcement
The Revised Text would grant broad enforcement authority to the
coastal nation as to living resources within its exclusive economic
zone. The enforcing nation is authorized to "take such measures, in-
cluding boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may
be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations en-
acted by it in conformity with the present Convention. ' 72 There are,
however, three restrictions imposed by the Revised Text upon the oth-
erwise nearly unlimited enforcement rights of the coastal nation: (1)
arrested vessels and crews must be released promptly "upon the
posting of reasonable bond or other security"; 73 (2) in the absence of
agreement with the foreign fishing nation, imprisonment is not an al-
lowable penalty for violation of fishing regulations, nor may the
coastal nation impose any other form of corporal punishment;74 (3)
the flag state must be promptly notified of action taken by the coastal
nation against foreign vessels.75
The Revised Text does not specifically grant the coastal nation uni-
lateral enforcement competence seaward of its exclusive economic
zone. Enforcement of regulations applicable to anadromous stocks
beyond the zone must be by agreement between the source nation and
70. Id.§ 201(0, 16U.S.C.A. § 1821(f).
71. Developing foreign nations could not be accorded more favorable treatment







other concerned nations.76 Curiously, the Revised Text contains no
enforcement provision at all concerning Continental Shelf species be-
yond the exclusive economic zone, even though the Text recognizes
the "sovereign rights" of the coastal nation in the "sedentary species"
of the shelf 77 and despite the Text's acknowledgement that these Con-
tinental Shelf species can be found outside a 200-mile economic zone
boundary.78 Arguably, enforcement rights are reasonably implied.
Whether the enforcement limitations specifically applicable within the
exclusive zone also by implication restrict the coastal nation in the
extra-200-mile exercise of its Continental Shelf fisheries is, however, a
closer question.
The FCMA would seem to overstep, in certain respects, even the
broad grant of authority that would be established by a Revised Text
treaty. As already noted,79 the Act claims exclusive jurisdiction to reg-
ulate fishing for United States-source anadromous species throughout
the migratory ranges of those species. The Act also provides that it is
unlawful for any person "to violate any provision of this Act or any
regulation or permit issued pursuant to this Act;"'8 0 or for a foreign
vessel to fish for any United States-source anadromous species any-
where without a United States permit.8 ' Civil and criminal penalties
are established for commission of these acts. 82 Various arrest, inspec-
tion, boarding, and search and seizure rights are also claimed.8 3 To
the extent that these enforcement measures84 are taken unilaterally by
the United States beyond 200 miles against vessels of a foreign nation
that has not by agreement recognized the claimed United States juris-
diction over anadromous species, the enforcement conduct would be
unlawful under the prospective LOS treaty.
Another potential conflict concerns the Revised Text's general dis-
76. Article 55(3)(d).
77. Article 65(l), (4). This provision is, of course, a restatement of rights already
recognized under international law. See Convention on the Continental Shelf, done
April 29, 1958, art. 2(1), (4), [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311,312, 314.
78. See, e.g., Articles 64, 70.
79. See notes 6 & 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
80. FCMA § 307(1)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(l)(A) (West Supp. 1977).
81. Id. § 307(2)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(2)(B).
82. Id.§§ 308-310, 16U.S.C.A. §§ 1858-1860.
83. Id.§ 311, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861.
84. For an excellent analysis and discussion of enforcement under the FCMA.
see Fidell, Enforcenent of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
The Policeman's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REV. 513 (1977).
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allowance of imprisonment as a form of punishment for violating the
coastal nation's "fisheries regulations" within the exclusive economic
zone.85 For certain offenses under the Act, imprisonment is a permis-
sible penalty.86 These offenses include fishing by a foreign vessel
without the required United States permit,87 certainly a violation of a
"fisheries regulation." Other offenses under the Act--such as forcible
resistance to inspection, resistance of arrest, and obstructing another's
arrest 88-might be characterized as violations of criminal enforce-
ment laws rather than fisheries regulations. If so, the treaty's imprison-
ment disallowance will not conflict with the Act's allowance of im-
prisonment as a permissible penalty for these offenses. Nevertheless, it
is possible to argue that "fisheries regulations," as the term is used in the
Revised Text, refers to the complete scheme of jurisdictional authority
over fisheries, including enforcement laws, granted by the exclusive
economic zone provisions to the coastal state. The latter interpretation
would be consistent with the Text's unqualified requirement that ar-
rested vessels and crews be released on posting of security. It is also
consistent with a desire undoubtedly felt by some nations to prevent
imprisonment of their own nationals, under any circumstances, in cer-
tain other nations with different philosophies of crime and punish-
ment. The Revised Text does recognize the validity of agreements by
85. Article 61(3).
86. FCMA § 309(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1859(b) (West Supp. 1977), provides for im-
prisonment for not more than six months, or a fine of not more than $50,000, or both,
for the commission of any acts prohibited by FCMA § 307(1)(D), (E), (F), or (H),
16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1)(D), (E), (F), or (H) (West Supp. 1977). Acts prohibited
by those subsections include refusing to permit an authorized officer to board a fishing
vessel for search or inspection, forcibly assaulting or interfering with that officer in
the conduct of the search or inspection, resisting lawful arrest, and interfering with,
delaying, or preventing the arrest of another person knowing that such person has
committed a FCMA § 307, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (West Supp. 1977), violation. An
additional penalty of imprisonment for not more than ten years, or a fine of not more
than $100,000, or both, is provided if the above offenses are committed using a dan-
gerous weapon or in such manner as to cause bodily injury to the officer or put the
officer in imminent fear of bodily injury. Offenses described in § 307(2), 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1857(2) (West Supp. 1977), are punishable by imprisonment for not more than
one year, or a fine of not more than $100,000, or both. That section prohibits fishing
by any foreign vessel, and the owner or operator of any foreign vessel, within the
boundaries of any State, or, "within the fishery conservation zone, or for any anadro-
mous species or Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond such zone, unless such
fishing is authorized by, and conducted in accordance with, a valid and applicable
permit issued pursuant to [section 204(b)-(c) of the Act] ."
87. Id. §§ 307(2), 309(a)(2), 309(b), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857(2), 1859(a)(2),
1859(b) (West Supp. 1977).
88. See id. §§ 307(1), 309(b), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857(1), 1859(b).
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foreign nations to waive the anti-imprisonment rule, 89 so United States
permits might be conditioned on recognition of the applicability of the
Act's penalty provisions by the foreign flag nations. : 0 This would not,
of course, resolve the clear conflict beween the Revised Text and the
Act's allowance of imprisonment for foreign fishing without a permit
or in the absence of a Governing International Fishery Agreement.
It is also uncertain whether the Act would comply with a treaty
mandate that arrested vessels and crews "be promptly released upon
the posting of reasonable bond or other security."91 With respect to
arrested vessels or property, the Act empowers and requires the
United States officer serving "any process in rem" to "stay the execu-
tion of such process" upon receipt of a satisfactory bond or other se-
curity. 92 Thus the Act, by its own terms, would seem to require that
arrested or seized vessels and other property be released upon posting
of security in some cases-that is, those involving service of "process
in rem." Moreover, the federal district courts, which are assigned ex-
clusive jurisdiction under the Act,93 are authorized to "take such other
actions as are in the interest of justice."9 4 Under this provision of the
Act, the federal courts would arguably be allowed, at least, to release
vessels (and perhaps crews) on receipt of security. Compliance with
the prospective treaty would, therefore, not be prohibited by the Act's
terms. Application of Federal Admiralty Rule E95 provides additional
89. Article 61(3).
90. Some of the Governing International Fisheries Agreements may in fact include
a disallowance of imprisonment as a permissible form of punishment, or a United
States promise to recommend no imprisonment, for foreign violations. With respect
to certain foreign fishing nations, an anti-imprisonment GIFA provision may be of
benefit to United States distant-water fishermen by way of reciprocity. The domestic
validity of such a GIFA provision, however, is at least questionable even if Congress.
in the exercise of its broad GIFA oversight powers, allows it to stand. See note 104
infra.
91. Article 61(2).
92. FCMA § 310(d)(l), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(d)(1) (West Supp. 1977). The Act
authorizes federal officers to seize any fishing vessel suspected of violating the Act,11with or without a warrant or other process." Id. § 311(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b).
Questions concerning the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures that this provision raises, at least with respect to American fishermen.
are beyond the scope of this article. See Fidell, supra note 84, at 560.
93. FCMA § 31 1(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d) (West Supp. 1977).
94. Id. § 31 l(d)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d)(4).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. E(5)(b) provides:
The owner of any vessel may file a general bond or stipulation, with sufficient
surety, to be approved by the court, conditioned to answer the judgment of such
court in all or any actions that may be brought thereafter in such court in which
the vessel is attached or arrested. Thereupon the execution of all such process
against such vessel shall be stayed so long as the amount secured by such bond
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authorization for release of vessels upon posting of security where the
Act does not so provide. Thus, the Act, when read together with Rule
E, may be consistent with the Revised Text release requirement as to
vessels.
The more likely conflict relates to the release of "crews" required
by the Text.96 The Act provides for punishment by fines or imprison-
ment of "any person"97 guilty of certain offenses under the Act and of
"the owner or operator" of any foreign vessel violating the Act's
permit requirement.98 The Act itself does not refer to the possibility of
release of arrested crew members-presumably including the vessel
captain--on the posting of bond. However, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, where not inconsistent with the Act, are un-
doubtedly applicable to fisheries enforcement matters brought before
the courts. Rule 46 requires release on bail of any person accused of a
crime,99 and this rule applies to accused aliens as well as United States
citizens. 100 However, Rule 46 is clearly designed also to ensure ap-
or stipulation is at least double the aggregate amount claimed by plaintiffs in all
actions begun and pending in which such vessel has been attached or arrested.
Judgments and remedies may be had on such bond or stipulation as if a special
bond or stipulation had been filed in each of such actions. The district court may
make necessary orders to carry this rule into effect, particularly as to the giving
of proper notice of any action against or attachment of a vessel for which a gen-
eral bond has been filed. Such bond or stipulation shall be indorsed by the clerk
with a minute of the actions wherein process is so stayed. Further security may
be required by the court at any time.
If a special bond or stipulation is given in a particular case, the liability on the
general bond or stipulation shall cease as to that case.
96. Article 61(2).
97. FCMA § 307(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1) (West Supp. 1977). The Act de-
fines "person" broadly to include "any individual (whether or not a citizen or national
of the United States), any corporation, partnership, association, or other entity(whether or not organized or existing under the laws of any State), and any Federal,
State, local, or foreign government or any entity of any such government." Id. § 3(19),
16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(19).
98. Id. § 307(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(2). See Fidell, supra note 84, at Part III-B.
99. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46.
100. It has been held that aliens in the United States are entitled to the protection
of its Constitution and laws with respect to their rights of person and property and
that they are entitled to this protection under certain circumstances, in both civil and
criminal proceedings against them. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
724 (1893); United States v. O'Rourke, 213 F.2d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1954). Further-
more, distinctions between aliens and citizens are considered inherently suspect and
are therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny whether or not a fundamental right is
impaired. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In Heikkinen v. United
States, 208 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1953), the issue for decision was whether the trial
court required excessive bail of a resident alien defendant who had not been brought
to trial on an information charging him with wilfully failing to depart from the
United States within six months from the date of an order of deportation. The court
noted that the alien defendant had "an absolute right to be admitted to bail, based,
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pearance of the accused for trial and possible imprisonment; the court
is admonished to set the amount of bail and conditions of release on
this basis. 101 On the other hand, the Revised Text, which contem-
plates fines but not imprisonment of convicted crew members,102 prob-
ably means that crews shall be "promptly released" to return to fishing
or to their foreign homes. Conditions of release on bail imposed by a
United States federal court-conditions designed to keep the accused
within the jurisdiction-would therefore not likely be consistent with
the prospective treaty.
At least some governing international fishing agreements (GIFA's)
negotiated thus far with foreign fishing nations, however, include pro-
visions, in language similar to the Revised Text release requirement,
for prompt release of vessels and their crews on the posting of "rea-
sonable bond or other security" to allow the vessels to resume fish-
ing.103 These GIFA's, then, are consistent with the Revised Text; but,
as to the amount fixed, on the standards prescribed by [statute] for the purpose of
securing his presence for trial." Id. at 740 (citation omitted).
101. It is provided in FED. R. CRIM. P. 46 that "[e]ligibility for release prior to
trial shall be in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3145, § 3148, or § 3149." 18 U.S.C. §
3146(a) (1970) provides:
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death,
shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial
on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance
bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in
the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required. When such a determination is made, the
judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods of re-
lease, impose the first of the following conditions of release which will reasonably
assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no single condition gives that
assurance, any combination of the following conditions:
(I) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization
agreeing to supervise him;
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the person
during the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and the
deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a
sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to
be returned upon the performance of the conditions of release;
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the
deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appear-
ance as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to cus-
tody after specified hours.
See also 8B NMOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 46.05 (2d ed. 1976).
102. Article 61(3).
103. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United
States, August 2, 1976, United States-Poland, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 94-613,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976). Article X(2) of that agreement provides: "In cases of
arrest of a Polish fishing vessel, the economic loss encountered by the vessel and crew
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as just indicated, they may also promise more than the terms of the
Act, read together with federal procedural rules, would require.104
The Revised Text's remaining restriction on basically unbounded
coastal nation enforcement rights-prompt notification to the flag
nation' 05 -is not required by the Act; but neither is it prohibited. No
necessary conflict results.
4. Other inconsistencies between the Act and the Revised Text
a. Delimitation of zone boundaries
Some inconsistencies of lesser importance, or less certain to present
actual conflicts, can also be noted. One of these possible conflicts con-
cerns the guidelines by which the boundaries of the United States
fishery conservation zone are to be established with respect to neigh-
boring countries. 0 6 The Act provides:
The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary [of Com-
merce], may initiate and conduct negotiations with any adjacent or
opposite foreign nation to establish the boundaries of the fishery con-
servation zone of the United States in relation to any such nation. 10 7
The Act thus simply authorizes the executive branch to negotiate
boundaries without delineating any guidelines for drawing the
boundary lines or establishing any methods for settling a negotiations
impasse.
By contrast, the Revised Text, while also directing delimitation of
the exclusive economic zone boundaries by agreement, requires that
because of lost fishing time shall be minimized through prompt release of the vessel
and crew upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security." Id. at 9.
104. Congress gave itself a broad veto power over all GIFA's. FCMA § 203, 16
U.S.C.A. § 1823 (West Supp. 1977). If any provision of an approved GIFA conflicts
with the terms of the Act, the effect of affirmative congressional approval of the in-
consistent GIFA provision is uncertain. Does the GIFA, which would not be a "treaty"
entitled to statutory status under the Constitution's supremacy clause, see notes 128-
205 and accompanying text infra, rise to the level of a statute because of congressional
approval? If so, it would be an amendment of the Act. Or, perhaps, the GIFA could
be viewed as an executive agreement authorized by an act of Congress and therefore
supersede the conflicting terms of the Act (at least to the extent that the Act itself
would permit the deviations). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 143 (1965).
105. Article 61(4).
106. See Fidell, supra note 84, at 531.
107. FCMA § 202(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1822(d) (West Supp. 1977).
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the agreement be "in accordance with equitable principles, employing,
where appropriate, the median or equidistant line, and taking account
of all the relevant circumstances."' 0 8 The draft treaty would further
require the negotiating nations to resort to dispute settlement proce-
dures if no agreement can be reached within a reasonable time. 0 9
Moreover, " [p] ending agreement or settlement, the States concerned
shall make provisional arrangements ..... 10
The treaty, therefore, will presumably include these mandatory,
though in some respects vague, instructions for determining bounda-
ries by agreement-restrictions which the Act does not impose. Argu-
ably, however, the Act does not prohibit adherence by United States
negotiators to the treaty guidelines, and thus the Secretaries could
conduct negotiations in accordance with the treaty rules without vio-
lating the terms of the Act.
b. The FCMA's "non-recognition" provision
The Act states that "[i]t is the sense of Congress"' 1 ' that the
United States will not recognize any foreign nation's claim to a fishery
conservation zone, or similar zone, if that nation:
(1) fails to consider and take into account traditional fishing activity
of fishing vessels of the United States;
(2) fails to recognize and accept that highly migratory species are to
be managed by applicable international fishery agreements, whether or
not such nation is a party to any such agreement; or
(3) imposes on fishing vessels of the United States any conditions or
restrictions which are unrelated to fishery conservation and manage-
ment.112
108. Article 62(1). "Median line" is defined as "the line every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured." Article 62(4).
109. Article 62(2). Procedures for the settlement of international disputes con-
cerning law of the sea issues were also a subject of negotiation and the pertinent
articles are located in Part IV of the Revised Text.
110. Article 62(3). Compare the Informal Text, supra note 21, which stated in
its Part II, Article 61(3): "Pending agreement, no State is entitled to extend its ex-
clusive economic zone beyond the median line or the equidistance line."
I 1l. Although "sense of Congress" resolutions have little, if any, binding effect
on the Executive's conduct of foreign affairs, they can be tremendously influential.
As Professor Henkin has stated, "Presidents cannot lightly disregard them." L. HEN-
KIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 86 (1972).
112. FCMA § 202(e), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1822(e) (West Supp. 1977).
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The first two of these three conditions for foreign-zone recognition
were apparently designed principally to allow the United States to
continue to protest the applicability of foreign 200-mile claims to
United States distant-water tuna fishermen-tuna being the principal
"highly migratory species. 11 3 As previously noted," 4 the Act does not
claim exclusive management authority over highly migratory species.
The purpose of the third condition is, pre~umably, to discourage
United States recognition of geographically extensive foreign claims of
authority to interfere with fishing vessels engaged solely in navigation
within the foreign zones.
The first two conditions of the FCMA's "non-recognition" provi-
sions are alluded to in the Revised Text. Under Article 51 the coastal
state, in granting economic zone fishing access to other nations (which
it is not required to do in all circumstances' 15), must take into account,
inter alia, "the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose
nationals have habitually fished in the zone."'1 6 Unlike the Act, the
113. United States tuna fishermen, primarily from California, have traditionally
fished the migrating tuna off the west coast of South America, often fishing well within
the claimed 200-mile zones of the nations along that coast. See OUR CHANGING FISH-
ERIES 222-24 (S. Shapiro ed. 1971); T. Wolff, Peruvian-United States Relations
Over Maritime Fishing: 1945-1969 (Law of the Sea Inst. Univ. of R.I., Occasional
Paper No. 4, 1970). The Act has been drafted, for the most part, in such a way as
to be consistent with the claims that the United States would like to make on behalf
of its tuna fishermen fishing off foreign shores. FCMA § 201(e), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e)
(West Supp. 1977), lists among the criteria for allocating among nations the allow-
able level of foreign fishing within the U.S. 200-mile zone "whether, and to what
extent, the fishing vessels of such nations have traditionally engaged in fishing in such
fishery." (emphasis added.) In addition, the Act makes no exclusive claim to U.S.jurisdiction over tuna found within the 200-mile zone. See id. § 103, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1813.
114. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
115. Article 51(2) sets out the circumstances under which the coastal nation is
required to grant foreign access:
The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of
the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity
to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other ar-
rangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions and regulations referred to in
paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch.
Paragraph 4 (Article 51(4)) provides a non-exclusive list of conservation measures
and conditions the coastal state is allowed to include in its regulations concerning
access by other states to its exclusive economic zone. Those listed relate to, for ex-
ample, licensing of vessels and the payment of fees; determining the size, age, and
number of those species allowed to be caught; regulating the gear, the number and
type of fishing vessels, and the seasons and areas of allowable fishing; requiring statis-
tical and scientific data to be kept; and the placing of observers or trainees aboard such




Revised Text does not except authority over highly migratory species
from the general grant to the coastal state of "sovereign rights" for the
purpose of managing fishery resources in its exclusive economic
zone. 117 A subsequent provision, however, does seem to require the
coastal nation in setting management rules to cooperate "directly or
through appropriate international organizations," with those nations
who fish the highly migratory species. 18 Whether an LOS treaty with
these provisions would be consistent with the first two conditions set
out in the Act's "non-recognition" provision is subject to argument.
The better argument appears to be that a zone established by a foreign
nation under the treaty would meet these two conditions and therefore
that no conflict would result. The foreign treaty zone would "consider
and take into account" traditional foreign fishing activity by other na-
tions to the extent that economic dislocation would result from termi-
nation of the activity in the zone; it also would seem to recognize the
need for international management of highly migratory species. On
the other hand it could be contended that since "sovereign rights" over
highly migratory species would not be excepted from the coastal na-
tion's treaty zone, management of those species could be carried out
in the zone unilaterally by the coastal nation pending international
settlement. Under these circumstances, the treaty zone nation would
fail "to recognize and accept" that highly migratory species are to be
managed only internationally. Yet if the United States is presumed to
be a party to the treaty, it would be required by the treaty to recognize
the foreign zone, whatever the proper interpretation of the highly mi-
gratory species authority, and the result of such recognition would be
an Act/treaty conflict, if the "sense of Congress" is given effect.
The Act's third condition to recognition of a claim to extended ju-
risdiction-concerning restrictions on fishing vessels not related to
fishery management-also presents an arguable conflict. The Revised
Text includes in the coastal state's economic zone authority "[jiu-
risdiction with regard to the preservation of the marine environ-
ment, including pollution control and abatement." 119 Standing alone,
this language would seemingly allow a coastal nation to regulate or
restrict vessel traffic, including fishing vessels, within its economic
117. Article 44(1)(a), quoted at note 22 supra.
118. Article 53(I). See also note 3 supra.
119. Article 44(1)(d), quoted at note 25 supra.
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zone and outside its territorial sea if the regulations or restrictions are
reasonably related to pollution control. This provision should, how-
ever, be read together with Part III of the Revised Text, which
specifically addresses protection and preservation of the marine en-
vironment. If this Part is also included in the future LOS treaty in its
present form, the authority of a coastal nation to restrict economic-
zone vessel traffic for pollution-control purposes would be limited.120
Nevertheless, a degree of residual jurisdiction would exist, and fishing
vessels could be affected. To the extent that the United States will be
required by the future LOS treaty to recognize this jurisdiction, the
Act's "non-recognition" provision is arguably not consistent with the
treaty.
The possible conflicts suggested between the Act and the prospec-
tive LOS treaty are only the most obvious ones that appear from an
overlay of the language of one upon that of the other. Additional con-
flicts might result from inconsistencies in later interpretations of word-
ings that presently appear to present no conflict. For example, the
conservation goal of the Act' 21 apparently matches in substance the
stated conservation goal of the Revised Text,122 even though the goal
is expressed in different terms in each. Subsequent interpretations
could well lead to conflicts that consistency of language would tend to
avoid. This is especially possible with respect to the conservation goal
statements, which are each couched in language recently subjected to
heavy criticism.1 23
The basic point to be noted, however, is this: the Act and the Re-
vised Text, though generally similar, are inconsistent in several re-
spects. In a few cases, the Act would seem to mandate the conflict, 2 4
while in others the Act allows but does not ensure United States com-
120. See Part III, Article 21(5).
121. The conservation goals of the Act are established by the definitions of "con-
servation and management" and "optimum," FCMA §§ 3(2), 3(18), 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1802(2), 1802(18) (West Supp. 1977), and the national standards, id. § 301,
16 U.S.C.A. § 1851. For a critical analysis of the Act's management objectives, see
Christy, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. Management Ob-
jectives and the Distribution of Benefits and Costs, 52 WASH. L. REv. 657 (1977).
122. See Article 50.
123. See, e.g., J. GULLAND, THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES 108 (1974)
(deficiencies of "maximum sustainable yield" concept); Holt, Objectives in Conserving
the Living Resources of the Sea, in EXCERPTS FROM CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 43 (R. Stein ed. 1975).
124. This is particularly true with respect to anadromous species jurisdiction, see
notes 42-51 and accompanying text supra, and allowable enforcement measures
within and beyond the zone, see notes 72-105 and accompanying text supra.
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pliance with the prospective treaty.1 25 At least with respect to the
former cases, the United States will be required by the LOS treaty to
reconcile the conflicts. In the latter instances, the United States should
ensure compliance with the treaty obligations and should also prevent
subsequent noncompliance which might arise from inconsistencies in
expression.
III. RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ACT AND
THE TREATY
Conflicts between legislation and a subsequent treaty ratified by the
United States will not be presumed by the courts; rather, consistency
is the presumption.' 26 Where conflicts do exist, the inconsistencies
must be resolved in favor of the treaty obligations. The Constitution's
supremacy clause, which by judicial construction equates treaties with
congressional legislation as the "law of the land,"' 27 automatically
resolves conflicts in favor of the later treaty to the extent that the
treaty is "self-executing." As will be demonstrated, however, it is no
easy task to determine whether or to what degree any treaty is self-
executing.
A. Resolving Conflicts in Favor of "Self-Executing" Treaty
Provisions-the Foster Doctrine
The general rule equating acts of Congress and treaties ratified by
the President upon the advice and consent of the Senate' 28 stems from
125. This is particularly true with respect to the delimitation of zone boundaries.
see notes 107-110 and accompanying text supra, and foreign access to living resources
of the 200-mile zone, see notes 65-77 and accompanying text supra.
126. See Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951); United States v. Lee
Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 222 (1902); 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1464-65 (2d rev. ed. 1945); Evans,
Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of Anerica, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178,
184 (1953).
127. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
128. The power to ratify treaties on behalf of the United States is granted by the
Constitution to the President, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate ....
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution. 129 The leading case for the
proposition that congressional acts and treaties are of equal rank is
the early Supreme Court decision in Foster v. Neilson.'3 0 In that case,
Chief Justice Marshall also formulated the important qualification
that non-self-executing treaties cannot operate as domestic law under
this rule until executed by the "political department":
[A treaty is] to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act
of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial depart-
ment; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can be-
come a rule for the Court.' 3'
The Foster principle is now a well-established domestic doctrine. 132
A logical extension of the act/treaty equivalence is that the later in
time controls any inconsistencies between them, and this corollary has
been upheld in the courts.133 A partial answer to questions concerning
resolution of the potential conflicts between the FCMA and the pro-
spective LOS treaty could be: the treaty, being later in time, controls
to the extent that the appropriate treaty provision is self-executing. It
therefore becomes important to inquire whether the prospective LOS
treaty will be considered self-executing in whole or at least in the
areas of inconsistency. To the extent that it remains merely unfulfilled
promises---a nonperformed contract, in Marshall's terms-the con-
flicts can be resolved only by legislation amending the Act.
Although Marshall's original distinction between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties has been applied and commented on
throughout the course of American judicial history,13 4 there is still no
129. See note 127 supra.
130. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
131. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
132. See Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940); Cook v. United
States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); People
of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir.
1974); Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967).
133. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118 (1933); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 163 (1972).
134. See cases cited note 132 supra.
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workable test for making the determination with any certainty.' 35
Some general guidelines, however, have been stated by various au-
thorities and are discussed below.
1. Intent test
The basic inquiry appears to be one of intent: Did the treaty parties
understand that the treaty would be immediately effective, or did they
intend that the treaty obligations would be implemented only by do-
mestic legislation? 13 6 As is true for other intent tests, this one does not
often allow for easy answers. The guidelines for determining intent are
also familiar: (1) Express terms in the treaty itself stating whether the
agreement is self-executing are controlling. 137 (2) In the absence of
express terms, the intent of the parties may be determined from the
language of the treaty document.' 38 Are the obligations broadly
phrased in "hortatory" or policy language, or is the wording clear and
definite, mandatory, resembling statutory language?139 (3) The history
135. See 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 304-05 (1970),
where the author quotes from a 1948 memorandum prepared for the State Depart-
ment Legal Adviser: "An examination of adjudicated cases and of some treatises and
of some of the law reviews has failed to disclose a clear definition of the term 'Self-
Executing Treaty.'"
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 141 (1965) (emphasis added):
(1) A treaty made on behalf of the United States . . . that manifests an intention
that it shall become effective as domestic law of the United States at the time it
becomes binding on the United States
(a) is self-executing in that it is effective as domestic law of the United States,
and
(b) supersedes inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of Congress or of the law
of the several states of the United States.
(2) A treaty made on behalf of the United States . . . that does ,lot manifest the
intention referred to in Subsection (1)
(a) is not self-executing and does not have the effect stated in Subsection
(1) . .
For commentary in accord on the intention test, see L. HENKIN, supra note I1l, at
158; McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in tile United States, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 709. 748-50 (1958); Comment, Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, 1968
U. ILL. L. FORUM 238; Note, Self-Executing Treaties, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 138 (1975).
137. See L. HENKIN. supra note Il1, at 158-59; Comment, supra note 136, at
241-42.
138. See authorities cited note 136 supra.
139. See Note, supra note 136, at 142. An illustration of the potentially crucial
importance of treaty language can be found in United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833). In that case the very same treaty between Spain and the
United States held to be non-self-executing in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253
(1829), was ruled self-executing by the Marshall court when it was acknowledged
that the Spanish verb "quedardan" ("shall remain") had been erroneously translated
in the treaty's English version as "shall be." Similarly, such phrases as "shall promote"
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of the treaty, the circumstances surrounding its negotiation and execu-
tion, its type and subject matter, and other matters broadly classified
as "surrounding circumstances" can also be relevant to the intent
issue.140 (4) Determinations or statements of the executive branch
concerning the nature of the treaty as immediate or prospective do-
mestic law are given "great weight" by the courts, 141 even though only
the United States Supreme Court can make a final determination.142
(5) The effect given the same treaty by other nation-parties in their
own domestic legal systems can also be indicative of the parties' in-
tent.143 (6) When all else fails, it is convenient to have a presumption
one way or the other. On this point there is apparently some disagree-
ment. It has been said that the courts are cautious in holding treaties
to be self-executing,14 4 seemingly raising a presumption that treaties
are generally not self-executing. On the other hand, courts are said to
"avoid construing an international agreement in such a way that it
becomes a 'mere unfulfilled national promise,' "145 suggesting a pre-
sumption favoring self-execution. The latter approach is supported by
the basic notion that treaties and statutes are constitutionally of equal
status, 146 arguably leading to the conclusion that treaties are to be
given the same effect as statutes unless there is some good reason to
do otherwise. One "good reason" would be the clear intent of the
treaty parties; but absent sufficient evidence of intent, the constitu-
tional grant of equality should control.
or "shall undertake" may qualify the obligation as a prospective one, indicating an
intent that implementation is needed, while "does hereby" may evidence the opposite
intent. See, e.g., Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); H. STEINER
& D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 584 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
STEINER & VAGTS].
140. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 112 (1933); Comment, supra note
136, at 242-43; Note, supra note 136, at 141-42.
141. See Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S.A. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
197 F. Supp. 230, 245-48 (S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Board
of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, S.A., 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1963). See also Comment, supra note 136, at 243; Note,
supra note 136, at 141-42.
142. See 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (1970); Reiff,
The Enforcement of Multipartite Administrative Treaties in the United States, 34
AM. J. INT'L L. 661, 669-71 (1940).
143. See Comment, supra note 136, at 244.
144. McLaughlin, supra note 136, at 748-49.
145. Note, supra note 136, at 147.




The courts have seemed to recognize other "good reasons," how-
ever, why a treaty should not be given effect without implementing
legislation. These reasons can be attributed to considerations of policy
and practicability, although they are sometimes expressed in terms of
the intent test. For instance, the classic example of a non-self-exe-
cuting treaty is one that calls for appropriation of funds for its imple-
mentation. 14 7 Only the Congress as a whole can appropriate money, 48
and therefore, the treaty cannot be self-executing--presumably even
if it is intended by the parties to be self-executing.
Perhaps a broader statement of the test for self-execution is whether
it is possible for a court to enforce the treaty absent its implementa-
tion. 149 Thus, for example, a treaty that might otherwise have re-
quired implementation has been deemed self-executing because of the
preexistence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for
direct implementation. 150 Also within this rule are probably the hold-
ings that a treaty cannot create domestic criminal laws, 15 even
though "treaties taking away the criminal jurisdiction of American
courts over foreign seamen are always regarded as self-operative."' 5 2
On the other hand there are certain additional types of treaties that
have generally been held self-executing. This category includes those
that confer rights upon individuals, especially aliens, and those set-
tling boundary disputes. 153
A question of some importance in the present discussion is whether
certain parts of the potential LOS treaty might be self-executing while
others would require implementation for domestic effect. Curiously,
147. See, e.g., W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN & R. PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (1969); HYDE, supra note 126, at 1455-56; STEINER & VAGTS,
supra note 139, at 584; Evans, supra note 126, at 185.
148. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 159; C. HYDE, supra note 126, at
1455-56.
149. See, L. HENKIN, supra note 11I, at 159; C. HYDE, supra note 126, at 1462;
Note, supra note 136, at 141.
150. People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502
F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974); Evans, supra note 126, at 186, 193.
151. See, e.g., The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925); STEINER & VAGTS,
supra note 139, at 584. This position, however, has been attributed to historical in-
ertia. 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-78 (Dep't of State Pub.
No. 1927, 1943); Comment, supra note 136, at 243 n.42.
152. Henry, When Is A Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MICH. L. REV. 776, 782 (1929).
153. See Evans, supra note 126, at 186; STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 139, at 585.
For a comprehensive listing of other treaties held self-executing, see Evans, supra note
126, at 186.
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the rules on self-execution are nearly always stated with reference to
"the treaty," not its often separable provisions, as if automatic opera-
tion of any treaty clause depends on a determination that the whole is
self-operative.154 Yet it is quite clear that the courts apply the rules to
individual clauses of treaties, at least tacitly assuming that parts may
be individually operative automatically without the necessity of a
ruling on the treaty as a whole. 155 In fact, one of the most cited cases
on self-execution 156 can stand for the proposition that certain articles
of the United Nations Charter, a treaty in the United States, are self-
executing while others are not. The definite impression left from an
examination of the authorities is that the self-execution rules allow
individual parts of a treaty to operate automatically. Certainly the
general intent test would not exclude this approach, and it will be the
view adopted in the present discussion.
All of these rules, guidelines, and examples, although helpful, still
leave the basic problem: It is not generally possible to determine with
certainty whether any treaty ratified by the United States is or is not
automatically operative, prior to a court decision on the issue. Unfor-
tunately, the new Law of the Sea treaty, if adopted, will probably not
be one of the exceptional, "easy" cases.
It is important to remember that the specific question addressed
here is whether the LOS treaty will automatically supersede con-
flicting provisions of the FCMA upon ratification. Some precedent
does exist concerning an earlier Law of the Sea treaty. In United
States v. Ray157 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: "To
the extent that any of the terms of the [Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act 'S8] are inconsistent with the later adopted Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf, they should be considered superseded."'159
Self-execution was apparently assumed. The court went on to rule, how-
154. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 141 (1965).
155. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 738 (1943) (Ship-
owners' Liability Convention) (concurring opinion of Stone, CJ.); Indemnity Ins. Co.
of North America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)
(Warsaw Convention); Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952)
(United Nations Charter).
156. Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
157. 423 F.2d 16(5th Cir. 1970).
158. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970).
159. 423 F.2d at21.
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ever, that there was "nothing in the pertinent language" of the conven-
tion that was inconsistent with the federal statute. 160
Nearly the same issue, involving the same treaty, subsequently
came somewhat more squarely before the federal district court for the
Southern District of Florida. In Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 16' the United States asserted title to a sunken 17th-
century Spanish vessel discovered by the plaintiff on the Continental
Shelf but outside the United States territorial sea. The government
argued, inter alia, that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCS-
LA) 162 placed the vessel within United States "jurisdiction," thus
giving title to the United States under the terms of the Antiquities
Act' 63 and the Abandoned Property Act. 64 The district court held
that the OCSLA asserts federal jurisdiction only over mineral re-
sources and therefore that the government's argument failed.' 65 The
court nevertheless examined the language and drafting history of the
Continental Shelf Convention. It noted that the rights to Continental
Shelf resources granted to coastal states were limited to "natural" re-
sources.' 6 6 Especially telling was the International Law Commission's
(ILC) report on the proposed treaty, in which the ILC expressly stated
the understanding that the rights described in the treaty did not cover
"wrecked ships and their cargoes (including bullion)."' 67 The court
was thus able to support its holding that the law of salvage, and not
the federal acts or the treaty, determined the plaintiff's rights in the
sunken vessel. The district court then made the comment especially
relevant to the present inquiry:
If, for purposes of argument, the Court accepted the government's po-
sition that [OCSLA] brings the abandoned property within the juris-
diction of the United States, then the inconsistent language of the
Convention On The Continental Shelf nullifies the jurisdictional effect
of [the OCSLA], at least in the context of the facts of this case. The
160. Id.
161. 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
162. 43 U.S.C. §§ 133 1-1343 (1970).
163. 16 U.S.C. §§ 432-433 (1970) ("lands owned or controlled by the Govern-
ment of the United States").
164. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970) ("within the jurisdiction of the United States").
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Geneva Convention On The Continental Shelf supersedes any incom-
patible terminology of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.168
Again, the necessary implication is that the court assumed the self-
executing effect of the 1958 Convention.
It is possible to draw a rather narrow, and unfortunately not very
authoritative, conclusion from the Ray and the Treasure Salvors
cases: United States treaties which delimit extra-territorial jurisdiction
in the seas are, to that extent, self-executing and supersede prior in-
consistent statutes. The guidelines for determining self-executing trea-
ties would necessarily except those treaties in which the parties intend
otherwise, as evidenced by the various indicia of intent set forth
above.169
In light of the general rules and the more specific suggested inter-
pretation of the Ray and Treasure Salvors cases, it is possible to draw
some tentative conclusions on whether the probable Law of the Sea
treaty will be self-executing as to those areas of potential conffict with
the FCMA. To the extent that the treaty is self-executing, unqualified
168. Id., citing United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970). In a list of
questions propounded by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during its consid-
eration of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions (including the Continental Shelf
Convention) for purposes of approval and consent, the State Department was asked
to "point out and explain any article of these conventions which has the effect of
superseding domestic legislation." The response was:
It does not appear that any of the convention provisions conflict with existing
legislation. It does appear, however, that some supplementary and new imple-
menting legislation may be necessary or desirable. (A detailed answer on this
aspect will be furnished shortly.) [A representative of the legal adviser's office
of the Department of State informed the committee on March 30, 1960, that in
their opinion no implementing legislation would be necessary, but that the matter
was still under advisement.]
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on the Law of the Sea Con-
ventions, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1960) (parentheses and brackets in original).
169. See notes 136-146 and accompanying text supra. Additional support for the
proposition stated in the text might be found in the Supreme Court's treatment of
one of the so-called "Liquor Treaties." An issue in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S.
102 (1933), was whether a treaty between the United States and Great Britain, which
authorized the Coast Guard to stop and board suspected British vessels within an
hour's sailing distance from the United States shores, was self-executing and there-
fore superseded, to the extent applicable, a prior federal statute setting a uniform
four-league limit. The Court held the treaty self-executing. Justice Brandeis stated for
the Court: 'The purpose of the provisions for seizure in [the statute], and their prac-
tical operation, as an aid in the enforcement of the laws prohibiting alcoholic liquors,
leave no doubt that the territorial limitations there established were modified by the
Treaty." Id. at 119. See also Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20
AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1926). Professor Henkin points out, however, that Cook is the
only case "in which the Supreme Court held that a treaty provision repealed an earlier
statute, and that was a 'liquor prohibition' statute which had notoriously low estate,




ratification by the United States will automatically resolve the conflicts
in favor of the treaty upon its effective date; otherwise, implementa-
tion will be needed to fulfill the United States obligations imposed by
the treaty. It should be remembered that the Act and the Revised Text
are basically consistent; therefore, the preavailability of the Act's pro-
visions, the regulations, and the international-agreement scheme
should allow self-execution of many treaty provisions.1 70
B. Resolving Specific Conflicts Between the Act and the LOS Treaty
1. Jurisdiction over anadromous species
The Act's assertion of exclusive management authority over United
States-source anadromous species throughout their entire migratory
patterns presents the clearest conflict with the probable treaty.1 71 A
superficial reading of Article 55 of the Revised Text-the anad-
romous species provision-would indicate an intent that the treaty
will not be effective until later implementation by source-state regula-
tions and international consultations and agreements, for the reason
that much of the wording is prospective in nature. 7 2 Yet a necessary
implication of Article 55 is that source-state exclusive jurisdiction over
(as contrasted with "primary interest in and responsibility for" 173)
anadromous stocks is restricted to the source state's exclusive eco-
nomic zone and is apparently limited even within the zone. 174 The
Ray-Treasure Salvors "doctrine," as discussed above, arguably would
deem the treaty self-executing and the preexisting FCMA superseded
to this extent. The Revised Text's anadromous species article is also
analogous to those self-executing treaties that settle boundary dis-
putes. Thus any post-treaty unilateral attempt by the United States to
170. See People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502
F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
17 1. See notes 42-51 and accompanying text supra.
172. For example, Article 55 states, in pertinent part:
2. The State of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure their conservation
by the establishment of appropriate regulatory measures . ...
3. . . . (d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond
the exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement between the State of origin and
the other States concerned.
173. Article 55(1).
174. See, e.g., Article 55(2), (3), and (5) (state of origin has duty to cooperate in
minimizing "economic dislocation" in other nations fishing the source-state's anadromous
stocks).
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assert management regulations over extra-200-mile salmon fishing ac-
tivities by foreign nationals should be ruled invalid.
2. Foreign access
The possibility that the Act's potentially exclusive claim to 200-mile
fishery resources might run afoul of the LOS treaty's preferential ju-
risdiction allowance was noted earlier. 175 The pertinent Revised Text
language is:
Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the en-
tire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrange-
ments and pursuant to the terms, conditions and regulations referred
to in paragraph 4 [i.e., allowable management rules], give other
States access to the surplus of the allowable catch.'176
The language is definitely prospective in that it clearly looks forward
to implementation by the coastal state. If there were no preexisting
United States 200-mile zone law at the time of ratification of a treaty
using these words, then implementation by legislation, international
agreement, and regulation would be necessary for the treaty to have
domestic effect. Yet that will not be the situation. At the future time
of ratification, the Act will have provided legislation which, by inter-
pretation and action in the executive branch-that is, the allowance
of foreign fishing under the GIFA system and existing-agreement rene-
gotiation-will probably meet the implementation requirement. 177
Nevertheless, the Act arguably does not require the continuance of
this system; foreign access is not explicitly mandated. A case can
therefore be made that further "implementation" is necessary to insure
consistency with the treaty obligation by making the access require-
ment explicit. Still, to the extent of the basic foreign-access require-
ment, the pertinent treaty language should perhaps be viewed as self-
executing. It is a limit on coastal-state management authority and
therefore within the suggested Ray-Treasure Salvors rule. Any post-
treaty administrative termination of foreign access to excess fishery
175. See notes 53-64 and accompanying text supra.
176. Article 51(2) (emphasis added).
177. Cf. People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502
F.2d 90, 96-100 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussion of implementation requirement).
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stocks, without authorization by the treaty's rules, might therefore be
deemed invalid in any United States court test.1 78
The Revised Text rules, should they become treaty law, will also
require the United States, as a developed nation, to grant special ac-
cess consideration to developing coastal nations in the same "subre-
gion or region.' 79 The Act, however, requires "substantial" reci-
procity in access allowances.' 8 0 It is almost impossible to determine
with anything approaching exactness which countries, if any, will be
entitled to the "right" referred to in the Revised Text or what that
"right" is. Nevertheless, it does appear quite clear that the "terms and
conditions" of those nations' participation are intended to be ulti-
mately determined by future agreements among the concerned coun-
tries.' 8 1 Until those agreements are concluded, the treaty's rule of
privileged access for regional developing nations should be viewed as
non-executed.
3. Enforcement
As noted, among the most serious potential conflicts between the
Act and the prospective LOS treaty are those concerning enforcement
of the United States management jurisdiction. The three principal
conflict points are (1) extra-200-mile enforcement of anadromous-
species regulations; (2) the imprisonment penalty; and (3) the condi-
tions of release of arrested vessels and crews.' 82
The Revised Text states: "Enforcement of regulations regarding
anadromous stocks beyond the exclusive economic zone shall be by
agreement between the State of origin and the other States con-
cerned."1 83 The principal issue here is whether this provision is self-
executing. The operative verb, "shall be," is the same verb that was
178. It would not be accurate, though, to characterize the potential treaty's foreign
access provision as falling within the supposed general rule that treaties conferring
rights upon aliens within United States territory are self-executing. See authorities cited
note 153 and accompanying text supra. Even if the 200-mile zone can be termed
United States "territory," the foreign access provision confers the access right on "other
States," not individual aliens. Article 51(2) (emphasis added).
179. Article 59; see notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
180. FCMA § 201(f), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(f) (West Supp. 1977).
181. Article 59(2) provides: "The terms and conditions of such participation shall
be determined by the States concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agree-
ments ....
182. See Part II-B-3 supra.
183. Article 55(3)(d).
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construed by the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson'84 to indicate
non-self-executing intent. Certainly no court will be able to recognize
enforcement procedures under the quoted Revised Text article prior
to their implementation by international agreement, and in this sense
the article cannot be self-executing because a future act is required.
Yet a court can, immediately upon the treaty's effective date, itself
impose the negative implication of the article: that unilateral United
States enforcement is not valid. In this sense, the article should prob-
ably be viewed as self-executing, either under the Ray-Treasure Sal-
vors doctrine 185 or the boundary settlement rule.186 The Act's enforce-
ment provisions, insofar as they relate to anadromous species beyond
200 miles, should be deemed superseded by the treaty.
The prospective treaty's disallowance of imprisonment as a penalty
for violations of fishing zone regulations 187 should also be considered
self-executing. Though the Revised Text provision is classifiable as a
domestic criminal law, supposedly not self-executing, 188 it is also one
that, partially at least, takes away criminal jurisdiction over "foreign
seamen,"'189 making it arguably self-executing. These two seemingly
conflicting principles can be reconciled by interpreting the first to
mean that treaties cannot automatically confer criminal jurisdiction
on United States' courts. This suggestion would then recognize the self-
executing nature of automatic treaty-imposed limits on criminal juris-
diction, at least over aliens.' 90 Absent agreement to the contrary, the
treaty should be deemed self-executing as to the imprisonment disal-
lowance, thus automatically removing imprisonment as a possible
punishment for foreign violators of the Act's regulatory scheme.
The requirement that vessels and crews "shall be promptly released
upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security,"'191 allowing
them to resume fishing or return home, 92 should similarly be deemed
self-executing. The same reasons noted with respect to the anti-im-
prisonment rule apply here also. It can be observed that the verb
184. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-15 (1829) (treaty provision that land grants "shall
be ratified and confirmed" required congressional action to be effective).
185. See notes 157-69 and accompanying text supra.
186. See authorities cited note 153 and accompanying text supra.
187. Article 61(3).
188. See authorities cited note 151 supra.
189. See authorities cited note 152 supra.
190. See authorities cited note 153 supra.
191. Article 61(2).
192. See text accompanying notes 97-103 supra.
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"shall be" is used here in a context different from that of either the
Foster treaty 93 or the Revised Text's anadromous species enforce-
ment provision.' 94 The language here appears to be a direction to the
court itself, in statutory-type language, neither contemplating nor re-
quiring the middle step of implementing legislation.
4. Zone boundaries
The LOS treaty will probably impose certain guidelines and restric-
tions upon the negotiation of economic zone boundaries between
opposite and adjacent countries. 9 5 If, by the treaty's effective applica-
tion, there remain boundary problems still unsettled by agreement
between the United States and its neighbors, 96 these treaty instruc-
tions will control the negotiations. Such provisions are not expressly
mirrored in the Act, though neither are they expressly prohibited.
The language of the treaty concerning zone boundaries is, of
course, prospective in the sense that it looks to future agreements. But
there should be no reason to characterize the obligation to follow in
good faith the treaty's guidelines and restrictions as non-self-exe-
cuting. No contrary intent is evidenced, and implementation by con-
gressional legislation would seem to add nothing to the domestic en-
forceability of the treaty provision. 97
5. "Non-Recognition"
Because the Act's "non-recognition" provision is stated only in
terms of the "sense of Congress, '"198 it does not present a true conflict
193. See note 184 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
195. See notes 108-110 and accompanying text supra.
196. Such agreements will be given effect. Article 62(5). The "neighbors" of the
United States, for economic zone boundary purposes, include not only Canada and
Mexico, but also the Soviet Union, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas and
others.
197. It is difficult to conceive of a domestic enforceability dispute over the boun-
dary negotiation rules reaching United States courts. Nevertheless, the self-execution
rules are said to apply also to enforcement by the executive branch. Evans, supra note
126, at 190-93.
198. FCMA § 202(e), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1822(e) (West Supp. 1977). For a discus-
sion of "sense of Congress," see Note, Congressional Authorization and Oversight of
International Fishery Agreements Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 495, 496 & n. 9 (1977).
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with the prospective LOS treaty. "Sense" will remain, for whatever
legal effect it may have, until it is repealed by later statutory amend-
ment, or unless it is automatically superseded by the LOS treaty.
Thus, the treaty, which might require recognition of foreign zones for
which recognition would not meet the "sense of Congress,"' 99 presents
several issues. The first question is whether the treaty grant of coastal
state economic zone authority over highly migratory species su-
persedes the Act's "sense" rule that the United States refuse to recog-
nize foreign zones which claim such authority.200 The second "non-
recognition" issue is whether the treaty's grant to the coastal state of
jurisdiction to preserve the marine environment within its exclusive
economic zone supersedes the Act's "sense" rule disallowing recogni-
tion of foreign-zone claims of non-fishing-related restrictions on
fishing vessels. 201 Both treaty provisions are affected by other arti-
cles,202 but both arguably conflict with the "sense of Congress" to the
extent of the residual jurisdiction they grant to coastal states.203 The
treaty grant of authority in each instance is contained in Article 44 of
the Revised Text, one of the provisions containing clear self-executing
language: "the coastal State has [the listed rights and jurisdic-
tions] .,1204 Therefore, it should follow that United States ratification of
an LOS treaty containing this article will automatically supersede any
contrary congressional law, especially a "sense of Congress" rule.
Thus United States recognition of treaty-sanctioned foreign zones
would be unhampered by any legislative "disfavor."
6. Other conflicts
Other possible conflicts, similar to those just discussed, will have to
be considered on a case-by-case basis, in the absence of congressional
implementation of the assumed LOS treaty. Unfortunately, there is no
reliable "rule of thumb" on the question of self-execution, and there is
no federal agency or office, short of the Supreme Court, capable of
ultimately determining the issue in context. 205 Although arguments
199. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text supra.
200. See notes 115-18 and accompanying text supra.
201. See notes 119-20 and accompanying text supra.
202. Article 53(2); Part III, Article 21(5).
203. See notes 115-20 and accompanying text supra.
204. Article 44 (emphasis added).
205. See Reiff, supra note 142, at 669-7 1.
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such as those set forth above can be made, they do not dispose of the
questions.
There is one relatively sure method of settling potential conflicts
between congressional legislation and a subsequent treaty: the legisla-
tion can be amended, in accordance with the treaty's language, to
bring domestic law in line with international obligations under the
treaty.
IV. AMENDING THE ACT: THE POLITICAL APPROACH
The FCMA is a unilateral claim to broad extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion in the ocean. In most respects it is probably a valid claim under
an emerging norm of customary international law,20 1 but in certain
other respects it may well be invalid.2 0 7 The Third Law of the Sea
Conference is attempting, in part, to settle doubts and controversies
surrounding such claims by devising a treaty that will establish widely
acceptable rules and limitations for the exercise of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction by coastal nations. If and when that treaty becomes a reality
and binds the United States, the extent of the United States claim will
be defined and circumscribed as to other treaty parties, not by con-
gressional interpretation of an emerging norm of customary interna-
tional law, but by that treaty. The United States will then be obliged
to trim the edges of its preexisting claim wherever it extends beyond
the delimitations of the treaty. Because of the vagaries of the self-ex-
ecution rule, the constitutional statute/treaty equivalence provides at
best a haphazard method of resolution, the success of which can be defi-
nitely determined only retroactively as controversies arise. In the
206. Regarding the development of an analogous customary international law con-
cept, the Continental Shelf doctrine, Lauterpacht has written:
Unilateral declarations by traditionally law-abiding states, within a province which
is particularly their own, when partaking of a pronounced degree of uniformity
and frequency and when not followed by protests of other states, may properly be
regarded as providing such proof of conformity with law as is both creative of cus-
tom and constituting evidence of it.
Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 395
(1950). The recent history of the 200-mile concept would seem to meet Lauterpacht's
test for the creation of a customary international norm. See note 20 supra. On custo-
mary rules of international law, see also I.C.J. Stat., art. 38(1)(b); W. BISHOP, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 25-33 (3d ed. 1971); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 59-62 (6th ed. 1963); A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1971).
207. For example, the Act's extra-200-mile claim to anadromous species undoubt-
edly has insufficient basis in state practice to be valid as an exercise of a customary
international right.
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situation under discussion-a treaty inconsistent with a previously en-
acted statute-prospective resolution by amendment of the prior legis-
lation should be the preferred method, even where there is only some
doubt as to the consistency of the two laws or as to the treaty's self-
executing effect.
There is, of course, no way that Congress can be compelled to
amend prior inconsistent laws. That body must make its own decision,
in a political context, regarding the implementation of treaties. Yet
the treaty-ratification process in this country does provide opportuni-
ties for urging and assisting Congress to resolve potential inconsisten-
cies between treaties and existing statutes.
Basically, ratification of a multilateral treaty takes place in the fol-
lowing manner: 208 (1) The treaty, adopted by an international confer-
ence, and perhaps signed by a United States representative, is sub-
mitted to the State Department. (2) The Secretary of State submits the
treaty, together with his recommendations and any comments, to the
President. (3) The President, if he wishes, transmits the treaty to the
Senate with a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate
to ratification; the President at this point may incorporate any recom-
mendations and commentary of the State Department or, presumably,
his own. (4) The Senate considers the treaty in committee and in floor
debate before taking the vote on advice and consent. (5) Upon affirm-
ative vote by two-thirds of the Senators present, 209 the treaty is sent
back to the President for his ratification. (6) The President ratifies
according to the treaty's terms with any appropriate or required con-
ditions, reservations, or understandings. 210 (7) When the treaty be-
208. See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS.,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON OCEANOGRAPHIC RESOURCES,
FISHERIES, AND WILDLIFE TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY 268-90 (Comm.
Print 1970) (United States procedure for ratification of the four 1958 Geneva Law of
the Sea Conventions) [hereinafter cited as SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE]. See also
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-55 (1970).
209. U.S. CONST. art. II, ,§ 2, cl. 2.
210. For example, President Eisenhower's message to the Senate seeking its advice
and consent to ratification of the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas requested that the Senate resolution of advice and
consent include an understanding "that such ratification shall not be construed to im-
pair the applicability of the principle of 'abstention' [regarding source-state rights in
anadromous species] ." SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 208, at 269. The
Senate's advice and consent to the Convention's ratification was subject to this "under-
standing," which had been requested by the President. Id. at 260, 268-71. For further
discussion of the Senate conditions or "reservations" to its advice and consent, see L.
HENKIN, supra note I 11, at 132-3 6.
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comes effective for the United States, it is proclaimed by the President
as law.
With this procedure in mind and in reference to ratification of the
possible future Law of the Sea treaty, the following steps toward res-
olution of the conflicts between that treaty and the FCMA are here
recommended: (1) Prior to the treaty's submission by the State De-
partment to the President for his transmittal to the Senate, the Depart-
ments of State and Commerce and the Attorney General should care-
fully examine the provisions of the treaty and the Act for potential
conflicts. Certain conflicts are likely to exist; others might well de-
velop because of variances in language that can be subject to incon-
sistent interpretations. 211 (2) In submitting the treaty to the President,
the State Department should recommend amendments to the Act,
both to resolve the apparent conflicts and to make language discrep-
ancies consistent. This recommendation is advisable regardless of
whether parts of the treaty might be self-executing in the opinion of
the Government experts; although the opinions of the executive
branch in this regard are given "great weight," they are not determina-
tive.212 Amendments to the Act would be recommended not neces-
sarily because implementation of the treaty is required but because of
self-execution uncertainties. In addition, the State Department should
urge the administration to draft a bill with appropriate amendments
for submission to Congress should the treaty be ratified. (3) The Presi-
dent should then incorporate the State Department recommendations
in his message accompanying transmittal of the treaty to the Senate
for its advice and consent. (4) Upon the Senate's advice and consent,
and its approval of the recommendations of the executive branch, ap-
propriate amendments to the Act should be drafted by the administra-
tion, possibly including any Senate suggestions, and submitted to both
houses of Congress. With this impetus, Congress could anticipate the
effective date of the LOS treaty by matching United States legislation
to the treaty requirements before it becomes law.
Other approaches to resolving conflicts between the Act and the
treaty are possible but are not here recommended. One approach
would have the United States, at the instigation of the Senate, the
211. See Part II supra.
212. See L. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 243; Comment, supra note 136, at 243;
Note, supra note 136, at 141-42.
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President, or both, enter reservations to the application of the treaty
to the United States in the areas of conflict. This procedure will be
especially appealing with respect to the Act's anadromous-species
claim. On the other hand, the treaty is not likely to provide for such a
reservation in the areas of conflict discussed above; in such a case any
such reservation would have uncertain and unsatisfactory effects-it
may or may not effectively prevent application of the reserved part of
the treaty to the United States. 213 Moreover, a widely accepted LOS
treaty might be viewed as a "codification" of the customary law of the
sea, thus possibly nullifying the reservation as to those treaty patties
who have not accepted it.214 Certainty in the laws of ocean use is a
desirable goal and reservations should therefore not be encouraged, at
least not for the principal purpose of resolving conflicts with existing
legislation of any one treaty party.
Another device not recommended here which would tend to resolve
conflicts between the Act and the treaty is conditional ratification. The
President could presumably refuse to ratify unless and until amenda-
tory legislation is passed by Congress. The Senate might likewise con-
dition its approving advice and consent on amendment of the Act.215
The effect, however, of such a gambit in obtaining the desired legisla-
tion from Congress is doubtful at best. Only in the case of firm con-
viction that the treaty should not bind the United States absent the
amendatory legislation would it be advisable to employ this device.
An approach similar to that suggested in this article was adopted
during the United States ratification process for the International
Coffee Agreement. The executive branch and the Senate agreed that
this multilateral treaty required domestic implementation, and draft
213. On the complex topic of treaty reservations, see Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, arts. 19-23, U.N. Doe. AICONF.39/27, reprinted
in 63 AJ.I.L. 875, 881-83 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 124-129 (1965); 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 132-93 (1970). For a discussion of reservations with reference to LOS
III, see H. Knight, The Potential Use of Reservations to International Agreements
Produced by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in POLICY
ISSUES IN OCEAN LAw 1 (Am. Soe'y of Int'l Law, Studies in Transnat'l Legal Policy
No. 8, 1975).
214. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [ 1969] I.CJ. 3.
215. See L. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 132-36; 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 138 (1970).
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legislation was introduced.2 1 6 It is suggested here, however, that a de-
termination of the necessity of implementation should not be a prereq-
uisite to an executive or Senate suggestion of implementation; doubts
as to self-execution should be sufficient. Unfortunately, the Coffee
Agreement example also indicates that the suggested approach does
not assure success. Implementing legislation was not enacted until
nearly two years after final United States ratification..2 17
The hard fact is that our constitutional system does not provide a
certain method for prospectively determining whether or to what ex-
tent a treaty will supersede, and thus resolve, conflicts between its
terms and those of existing legislation. Too often the international polit-
ical decision to become bound to international obligations must be
followed by a domestic political decision on whether to honor those
obligations. When and if the United States ratifies a new Law of the
Sea treaty, it is hoped that any actual and potential inconsistencies
with the Fishery Conservation and Management Act will be resolved
by Congress prior to the treaty's effective date.
216. See Bilder, The International Coffee Agreement: A Case History in Negotia-
tion, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 328, 373 (1963). The President's deposit of an "intent
to ratify" (provided for in the treaty) also conditioned the treaty's binding effect for
the United States on subsequent congressional implementation. Id. n. 61.
217. See STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 139, at 587.
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